Account of the Action, 20–22 April 1971

Lt. Col. W.G. Bacon wrote this account in July 1997 in response to a request from Capt. William D. Neal for information about the action D/2/8 Cav was involved in on 20 April 1971. The letter is addressed directly to Neal and includes a separate attachment with Bacon's operational observations.

W.G. (Gary) Bacon 8 CAV. WDN — 17 July 1997

William D. Neal D 2/8 CO

Dear Bill,

What a surprise to hear from you after all these years — and a pleasant surprise it was. I must apologize for the delay in responding to your request for information on the fight your company was involved in on 20 April 1971. First, I did not get back to my "base camp" here in the Dallas area until the first week in June, and since then have been trying to dredge up the details of what transpired at my level at that time. This has been a particularly difficult task since I have had little or no contact with anyone in the military since I retired in July 1976 and have given little thought to those experiences over the years for reasons those of us who were there understand.

I have added my observations as an attachment to the letter which will keep the document free from any trivia not appropriate to pulling together factual information describing the event.

Other sources of information that might be able to add to the picture that I think of are:

CSM Tom Caruthers. I know he has retired and when last I heard of him (1976) he was Command Sergeant Major of one of the Armored Divisions at Fort Hood. He was with me both in the air in the C&C (Command and Control helicopter) and when we joined you on the ground on 21 April.

Col. Charles H. Kinsley Jr. (USMA class of '63). Then, Major Kinsey was the Battalion S-3 and was closely involved in the operation. He flew the C&C and coordinated things while I was on the ground with the company on 21 April. I'm sorry that I do not have an address for him; he is retired.

Capt. (then), now BG John J. Ryneska (CG XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery). John Ryneska was the 1/21 Artillery Liaison Officer to 2/8 Cav and would have coordinated the delivery of all artillery fire support during the operation. He was USMA Class of 1968. He typically flew with me in the C&C almost 100% of the time.

I joined the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cav as Deputy Brigade CO under Col. Billy Vaughn in October 1970. In December I was assigned CO of 1/8 Cav in 2nd Brigade AO and about mid-February was assigned CO of the 2/8th Cav until my DEROS in July 1971.

By the time of the action of D/2/8th Cav on 20–22 April 1971, the 3rd Brigade (Separate) was all that was left of the 1st Cav Division in RVN. The Division (minus) had stood down and returned to the states (Fort Hood). The reason I mention this is the 3rd Brigade was the beneficiary of the finest leadership and staffing we could have ever assembled. We were able to replace short-timers in the 3rd Brigade ranks with the cream of the crop from among those in the returning 1st and 2nd Brigades who had less than three to six months in country and were subject to reassignment elsewhere in RVN. The result was that the 2/8th Cav wound up with a truly outstanding roster of key personnel. I will never forget the confidence and pride I took in the quality of the Company Commanders that were assigned to the 2/8 Cav as well as platoon leaders and key NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers). In my view we had assembled an elite group to lead the men for whom we were responsible and under very difficult and complicated mission parameters across the board.

I hope this information is useful in rounding out the details of D Company's fight on 20–22 April 1971. In reviewing the information you sent me with reports from other members of the company, I was reminded of how proud I was of how you and your key people handled a tough and challenging situation. It was a thrill and honor for me to have been part of a great team of professionals who consistently demonstrated all those personal traits and characteristics sought after in the combat infantryman when placed in harm's way.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

W.G. Bacon Colonel (Ret.), U.S. Army

Action of 20–22 April 1971 — Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 3rd Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division, Republic of Vietnam

Lt. Col. W.G. Bacon, Commander

The assigned Area of Operations of the battalion was an interesting and challenging one. Our mission was two-fold:

• Seek out and attack the Headquarters and subordinate elements of the 33rd NVA (North Vietnamese Army) Regiment operating in the assigned AO.
• In coordination with RVN Province (Long Khanh, Bien Tuy) and District local forces, interdict the use of Highway 1 and adjacent base areas as a main supply route by NVA and Viet Cong forces for the maintenance and support of enemy operations to the south.

Situation: During the February–March time frame, operations had been focused on attacking 33rd NVA elements in the mountainous area south of Highway 1 in our AO. At the same time, we worked with Province and District Chiefs and the forces at their disposal to interdict the use of Highway 1 as a conduit for the movement of supplies further to the south. Frequent night attacks on the fire base and daily contacts with the enemy by Battalion forces deployed in the AO attested to the sensitivity of the enemy to the presence of the 2/8 Cav in the midst of a theretofore major NVA/VC controlled operational area. Large supply caches were uncovered and significant disruption of enemy logistics activities were confirmed in captured enemy documents. During early April, intelligence and other sources suggested that the Headquarters of the 33rd NVA and supporting elements were shifting the base of their operations out of the mountains south of Highway 1 to the lower elevations north of the highway in order to gain access to water sources on which they were dependent with the onset of the dry season.

D/2/8th Cav was assigned the mission to investigate an area which included a stream that might support an enemy base camp and a suspected transit area with a dependable source of water during the dry season. Aerial reconnaissance had established that the stream was free-flowing and covered with dense vegetation on either side. Moreover, the area except for the stream was relatively flat, heavily vegetated, and lacking prominent terrain features. It was an area that had not been recently subject to systematic reconnaissance by the 2/8th Cav.

The morning of 20 April 1971 had been a busy one at FSB Fanning. General Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV (Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam), made a visit to the fire base for a briefing on the 2/8th Cav's activities and to inspect launch sites used by the NVA/VC to catapult unexploded live artillery rounds at night from outside the perimeter, fused to explode in the air over the fire base with the effects of an airburst. By the time of his visit, aggressive night patrolling and ambushes by the infantry company on the fire base had put a stop to the shelling and resulted in the capture of several launch devices.

As I recall, shortly after General Abrams and his entourage had departed the area, the first report of enemy sightings by elements of D/2/8th Cav came in — the report of enemy soldiers bathing in the stream that was the focus of the reconnaissance. I remember that the enemy were not immediately taken under fire and wondered what the circumstances were for not doing so. Not really having a good picture of the developments made by Capt. Neal with his platoons, I believe at the Battalion level we just cranked up the C&C and alerted the fire support elements available to stand by to support a possible contact in Delta Co's area. If we had a pink team operating in the area we may have vectored it in support of Capt. Neal's reconnaissance to develop the situation. It is my recollection that this first contact took place about mid-afternoon.

I am not sure how much time elapsed between the first sighting and the onset of the ambush of the 2nd Platoon on the north side of the stream. Once contact was made, a vicious firefight ensued resulting in heavy casualties to 2nd Platoon, D/2/8. I recall it was reported that the lead elements of the 2nd Platoon had walked into the approach to an enemy base camp — bunkers and all — and been ambushed by tree-mounted, command-detonated, claymore-type antipersonnel mines as well as enemy automatic weapons fire.

At this point it remained for D Company to extricate the 2nd Platoon from the ambuscade and evacuate its casualties concurrent with bringing all available supporting fires to bear on the enemy base camp area. Direct Support and General Support Artillery, Aerial Rocket Artillery, Air Cav recon and Cobra gunships, and USAF close air support — all were used during the action. A sortie of close air support fighter-bombers were in the area and were dispatched to attack the base camp area. I recall D Company was hard put to disengage from the enemy and move far enough away from the base camp so the bombers could drop their ordnance — large 500 lb. bombs in this case — without endangering D Company infantry. TAC air became available and was used late in the day after the evacuation of the wounded. Three friendly casualties, presumed KIA, were left at the ambush site. This was done with great reluctance but it would have been impossible to pull the KIA from under the guns of the ambush site without incurring additional casualties.

I do not recall mounting reinforcements from the FSB to either directly maneuver against the enemy base or block escape routes. It seems to me that we had another company operating nearby and they were vectored to block suspected escape routes to the north of the enemy base camp. Also, LZs (Landing Zones) were excruciatingly scarce in the AO.

The night of 20–21 April was a long one as we all agonized over not being able to extricate our KIA from the ambush site. However, plans were made to reenter the area at first light the next day supported by an aerial recon team and the full complement of fire support, including TAC air, available the previous day.

A small LZ used to evacuate D/2/8's casualties and to resupply the company was close to their night defensive position of the night of 20–21 April. We used this LZ to land the C&C ship on the morning of 21 April so CSM Caruthers and I could join the D Company CP group in its advance toward the base camp to recover our casualties and assess the situation. The Battalion S-3 (Operations Planning Officer, Maj. Charles Kinsey) and the Artillery Liaison Officer (Capt. John Ryneska) were airborne in the C&C to coordinate D Company's requests for fire and other support. A Brigade Air Cav Recon team was reconnoitering in advance of the lead elements of D Company in its approach to the enemy base camp. As the pink team flew over the base area, the low bird took enemy ground fire and broke off so the area could be worked over by the Cobra gunship and then later by ARA and DS Artillery. At the same time, it was reported that lead elements of D Company in their approach to the ambush site also came under fire. Frustrated by this unexpected sign of life in an area that had been so heavily shelled the day and night before, it was decided to back off from an obviously well dug-in enemy and pound the area some more until reconnaissance indicated it was safe to enter. It was reasoned that needless casualties would result from trying to dislodge the enemy from his well-fortified and still-occupied bunker system. Moreover, we had already rendered the base area untenable and were moving forces in to block suspected escape routes to engage the enemy on more even terms when he did choose to withdraw.

The area was attacked by air and artillery fire for the remainder of the day and night of 22 April, and on the morning of 23 April, D Company was able to enter the area uncontested and recover Delta Company's KIA.

One of the personal lessons I learned during this action was that no matter how frustrated one gets with a situation such as the one experienced by D/2/8 Cav on 20–22 April, the Battalion Commander's place is the one where he can best orchestrate the support needed by the elements in contact and maneuver other combat forces as the situation dictates. This was really driven home to me on the morning of 21 April. CSM Caruthers and I had joined the D Company CP group on the ground when the point and aerial recon team came under fire. I had wanted to be with the company on the ground for several reasons when the troops moved back into the enemy base camp. Thus it came as something of a surprise when the lead elements drew fire as they approached the bunker complex. We did not expect to find the enemy at home after being fixed and subjected to such heavy shelling. At this juncture it became painfully clear that my place was in the C&C ship in a coordinating role and not as an unexpected appendage to Capt. Neal's command and control apparatus during the firefight. A caveat to this observation is that intervention by a higher commander may be warranted in cases where existing leadership has disintegrated and the situation calls for a clear head with an eye on the complete picture. However, such were not the conditions with D/2/8th Cav on 20–22 April. The company was led by competent and seasoned veterans who knew what to do and when. They had demonstrated this in the past and were doing so again.

I concur with Capt. Neal's observation that the operation was a success. Certainly there were enemy personnel casualties both as a result of the immediate fight and shelling and probably from intercept of personnel uprooted from the base camp and on the move. Then there was the loss of the elaborate base camp itself and the supplies and equipment destroyed during the battle. But the intangible results — the reduction in the effectiveness of the 33rd NVA Regiment's logistics and command and control apparatus — were of perhaps greater import when taken in the context of the broader view and the ultimate measure of Cav mission accomplishment in the AO.